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Abstract Industrial welfare history presents important challenges to developmental
state theories in “late” industrialization. This article expands the debate by
examining how nation-states create statutory welfare by addressing institutional
variety beyond markets. It is simplistic to argue linear growth of national welfare or
of states autonomously regulating markets to achieve risk-mitigation. I contend that
welfare institutions emerge from the state’s essential conflict and collaboration with
various alternate institutions in cities and regions. Using histories of Europe, India,
and Karnataka, I propose a place-based, work-based, and work-place based welfare
typology evolving at differential rates. Although economic imperatives exist to
expand local risk-pools, it is precisely the alternate institutional diversity that makes
late industrial nation-states unable or unwilling to do so. This results in
institutionally “thin,” top-down industrial welfare. Ultimately, theories that overly
depend on histories of small nations, homogenous nations, or city-states, provide
weak tests of the economics of industrial welfare.
The state in late industrial welfare
The study of capital accumulation has generated the most influential state theories of
the twentieth century. In most, the state is posed against markets and acts as the
development institution of last resort in specifying cost structures and mitigating
risks during industrial transformation. This article examines the evolution of
industrial welfare during “late” industrial development. I analyze the historical
record of how states institute welfare and regulate markets, thus managing conflicts
between production and redistribution. I consider several questions: Are traditional
models of linear growth of welfare institutions appropriate for late industrializing
states? What is the appropriate scale of the “state”: nation, city, or region? Finally,
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under what conditions can and do states incorporate pre-existing institutions in
statutory systems?
My response is that it is simplistic to argue linearity of growth of national welfare
institutions or to consider states autonomously regulating markets to do so. We have
to look beyond classic market failure arguments. Instead, late industrial welfare
institutions emerge from essential conflicts and collaborations between states and
multiple alternate institutions, not markets alone. I emphasize here that while
economic and actuarial imperatives exist for nation-states to expand local risk-pools,
late industrial nation-states may be unable or unwilling to do so, resulting in
institutionally “thin,” top-down industrial welfare.
For reasons of space, I do not visit state ‘developmentalism’ in depth, but analyze
its welfare aspects in the following sections. I define industrial welfare as
institutionalized modes of state-supported social provision delivered to workers in
services and manufacturing, and then propose a terminology to better distinguish
comparative risk-mitigation in place-based, work-based, and work-place based
industrial welfare. These may not be exclusive domains of the state (in fact rarely
are). This sets up my enquiry into state rule over institutional variety. Its actions then
emerge from the trust (or lack of it) vested in it by other actors. Its legitimacy can be
seen through open-ended, evolving, and contested local norms. The economics of
this trust and information challenge in statutory expansion require closer scrutiny.
Nation-states continue to be dynamic variables in both theory and practice.
However, the development aspects of nation-states remain vastly under-theorized.
My task is thus more than pointing out exotic oddities from India. Rather, I consider
late industrial welfare evolution and variety as presenting an important challenge to
state theories. The productive side of late industrializing societies has been an
extraordinarily active research area for over 30 years, but the redistributive side has
largely been ignored or constituted in linear terms. This article starts to redress this
imbalance.
The economics of risk and industrial welfare
“I propose here the view that, when the market fails to achieve an optimal
state, society will, to some extent at least, recognize the gap, and nonmarket
social institutions will arise attempting to bridge it…..” (Arrow 1963a, p. 947)
Polanyi posed society’s dilemma as a double movement oscillating from
unregulated markets (the “fictitious self-regulating market”) to social protections in
order to minimize risk exposure in a fully waged economy (Polanyi 1944/1957). In
his Great Transformation, the state responds to wage-dependence and insecurities of
industrialization and urbanization, but is pulled in two often conflicting directions:
between supporting market capitalism through industrial production, and instituting
social protections to minimize its risks (see Table 1 below) often through a contested
amalgam of local parish and poorhouse.
In principle, workers can derive personal risk mitigation and security from: (1)
wage income and occupational welfare (2) private provision of savings and
insurance (3) voluntary welfare (e.g., families) (4) state intervention via labor
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markets, social structures, tax financing, and expenditures (Barr 1992). Industrial
welfare has historically had incentives and information characteristics manifested in
cash benefits, healthcare, education, food, housing, or other services (ibid.).
States may reduce transactions costs and mitigate risks (North 1987), attributes
purported to strengthen as “development” occurs (indeed seen as development).
However, in practice, neither states nor markets act exclusively against risks. Social
institutions such as family, kinship, religion, or caste have always served as
institutions of last resort. National statutory systems may mimic each other, but
informal risk and care systems are regionally and culturally distinct. Nation-states
must regulate markets and these institutions to expand coverage.
Risk-pooling occurs when insurers aggregate similar but unrelated risks through a
random selection of individuals. Private insurers often do not pool risks but cluster
them to effect a desired composition of individuals and risk. Larger pools instead
spread out the statistical odds against idiosyncratic risks of any individual.
Moreover, states can cover risks that private markets may be unwilling or unable
to provide, ensuring that welfare regimes provide efficient responses to social needs
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). The more compulsory the system, the better the risk-
pooling and higher the likelihood that states can de-link premium amounts from
individual risk (ibid.). Organizational delivery may be public or private. Markets or
states can generate incentives and information structures to broaden insurance and
risk-pooling behaviors and minimize adverse selection, moral hazard, and information
asymmetries. In principle therefore, it is efficient that risk-pools and solidarity
communities grow. However, social insurance implies information and political
challenges because market mechanisms may be inefficient in evening out information
differences among classes of people (Arrow 1963a, b; Arrow 1972). Moreover, the
state’s onus of persuasion and inclusion can be particularly high for compulsory
social insurance, and non-insurance can have negative effects.
Social insurance expansion is further influenced by the fact that nation-states view
employers as better risks than individual workers and thus focus on employer-
mediated institutions to mitigate risks and boost production. This may appear as a
Walrasian process in which the state matches employers to workers and thus
Table 1 Work and risk
Typology of risks Examples
Low frequency Serious illness, emergency hospitalization, loss of spouse
as care-giver or income-earner
High frequency Minor or chronic illness, occupational hazards
Idiosyncratic (random) Non-communicable diseases, occupational health,
loss of assets (e.g., flooding, fire, looting, confiscation)
Covariate (randomly but affects individuals,
households, community simultaneously)
Flooding, drought, inflation, riots, fire
Repeated shocks, risk events (covariate and
repeated)
Persistent drought, repeated flooding
(Adapted from Lund and Srinivas 2000, p. 47)
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facilitates production and market processes. Proletarianization therefore becomes not
only a state-sanctioned process of waged work, but also of shifting risk, oftentimes
incompletely, to different institutions over time. This incompleteness of shifting risk
is compounded by the fact that markets are themselves fundamentally gender-uneven
(Beneria 1999). Incompleteness can also galvanize states to subsidize alternate
institutions such as family with state-funded income supports, thus deepening gender
impacts (Orloff 1996).1
However, familiarity and locality generate their own risks. Adjacent and
homogenous communities can simplify administration and generate higher voluntary
subscriptions, but proximity heightens their exposure to covariate risks and repeated
shocks. Factory work and factory housing historically mitigated some risks and
exacerbated others through co-location. Mutual insurance was alien in some places
(Platteau 1997).Consequently, risk-pooling has particular economics and financing
and specific geographies and solidarities. These influence insurance failures of
adverse selection (riskier individuals are selected into the pool, creating too many
similar risks) and moral hazard (individuals adopt riskier behavior once insured).
The state’s rationing of benefits can temper these risks but over-rationing may stymie
participation and ultimately undermine the state’s legitimacy.
LIs contend with all risks listed in Table 1, many simultaneously, compounded by
industrial development. Nevertheless, despite the economic and actuarial imperatives
to expand risk-pools, it is precisely the diversity of alternate institutions that makes
LI nation-states unable or unwilling to do so.
Evolutionary states
Nation-states and non-market institutions
A “logic of industrialism” (LoI) predicts institutional convergence and weakly
explains the rise of social protection programs and roughly similar forms of labor
representation (Cutright 1965; Collier and Messick 1975; Flora and Alber 1981). It
seduces in suggesting that states linearly institute systems of social supports in
response to industrial development and technological change. Emphasis is on
modernization, on convergent market structures, and a rise in work-place entitle-
ments. Although empirically weak, this technologically deterministic thesis
continues to dominate assessment of and policy advice to late industrializers.2
However, “lateness” generates a diversity of institutional responses to economic
backwardness and a greater state role (Gerschenkron 1962). LIs have adopted
statutory welfare at earlier stages of economic development relative to Europe (e.g.,
Hort and Kuhnle 2000) but relegated this to a thin sliver of occupations and benefits.
National programs have rarely arisen by fiat but through a messy institutional
consolidation of local programs that rest in other risk institutions such as family,
2 Variants extend from “catch-up” schools (Abramovitz 1986; Baumol 1986; Gerschenkron 1962), to
modernization in social policy (e.g., Wilensky 1975; Flora and Alber 1981).
1 Governments pay for this “informal” social protection in early industrializers as well. Aging, childcare,
women’s labor market entry, and the collapse of extended family systems all affect care’s costs.
454 Theor Soc (2010) 39:451–470
caste, and religion. These include, among others, traditional funeral arrangements,
crop and savings insurance and voluntary savings schemes for weddings, sickness,
and productive assets. Few scale to national levels; most remain locally effective but
segmented (e.g., Lund and Srinivas 2000).
Tilly argues similarly that cities, states, and “trust networks” are often
contemporaries but suffer an uneasy relationship of trust and domination (Tilly
2004, and 2010 in this issue). Four ideal types populate history: autonomous cities,
city-states, centralized states, and nomadic empires (ibid.). I would argue that LI
nation-states can be scrutinized in this manner. For example, East Asian “nation”-
states are contestable in scale and institutional variety: Hong Kong and Singapore
were essentially city-states and entrepot economies, Taiwan a small, homogenous,
primarily agricultural nation-state.
In according supremacy to markets, development state models provide a
historically impoverished institutional story. After all, even in “market failure,” the
state can move beyond correcting markets to creating and legitimizing them through
alternate institutions. Through social insurance, LIs can potentially expand markets
and build demand through both markets and other institutions. They can
disproportionately shape markets through network effects, enlarging economies of
scale and scope, and by regulating and supplying social services. Thus, rather than
markets shaping the bounds of social protection, the latter may shape the former
(Srinivas 2008a).
Nevertheless, to achieve social welfare maximization, they must politically lower
costs and risks of decentralization and technological change. Further, by cross-pooling
diverse groups, they must limit adverse selection and retain access to and coercive
power over others. Essentially, this is an evolutionary exercise, often two steps
forward and one step back. Despite theories of state autonomy, LI nation-states may
not possess the means to control alternate institutions nor have goals of doing so.
Institutional integration: state rule and local rules
The state and its own institutions variously respond to this diversity and, by and
large, seek power over or collaboration with local rules. Proletarianization in
England and continental Europe, for example, was a process of state-induced
breakdown of place-based (and especially land-based) institutions of solidarity and
risk-pooling.
For early industrializers, three primary national varieties of welfare capitalism
exist (Esping-Andersen 1990). Liberal regimes prioritize unregulated labor markets,
individualize risks and depend heavily on market mechanisms to regulate the
economy. They extol “self-help” and are least likely to provide wide citizenship
entitlements (e.g., the United States and United Kingdom). Social democratic
regimes-classically Nordic—passively regulate labor markets by means such as
unemployment insurance but limit market scope and use the nation-state as bulwark
of entitlements. They offer wider socialization and coverage of risk (ibid.).
“Conservative-corporatist” regimes espouse passive labor market regulation, but
use mixed markets where necessary to advance Bismarckian, occupationally (not
citizenship)-based social insurance. They entail compulsory risk-pooling and strong
familial ties (e.g., Germany and Austria).
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However, national typologies hide variation. Evidence indicates that national
welfare effectively amounts to pay-as-you-go in several countries; most people who
use the system more than pay for it. Thus, an immense cross-pooling effort by
nation-states is less essential to welfare states than is often portrayed (Shaikh 2003).3
Moreover, LI dependent variables of ‘social security effort’ and per capita GDP hide
the risks in economic dynamism of some cities and regions (even in important
studies such as Pierson 2004; Chang 2002; Mkandawire 2004) and the local roots of
social citizenship and social rights (e.g. Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990).4 This
is crucial today because non-state actors are shaping welfare in dramatic ways (Lund
and Srinivas 2000; Barrientos 2004; Wood and Gough 2006). Local institutions for
identity, settlement, and work-status registration are especially crucial during urban
densification and can reveal channels for technological dynamism in LI production.
This introduces a localized bi-directionality into the usually posited causal link
between industrial development and welfare states.
A glance at LI cities and regions indicates that the ex-post national language
derived from early-industrializing examples offers limited insights for industrial
planning. Entirely new Indian, Chinese, or Korean townships have emerged for iron
ore, textiles, and automobile production while older mercantile cities have been
simultaneously reworked. Most LI nation-states have been poor at collaboration and
decentralized planning, instead resorting to coercion and the withholding of benefits,
failing to match up with any of the three standard national models. Even those East
Asian states depicted as strategic omniscient planners, rested their growth in
coercion, central economic controls, feminization of labor, dormitory systems, union
repression, and over-reliance on family welfare (e.g., Standing 1999).
Emergence and evolution: threads of the nation
Work, place, work-place
Although productivity increases and industrial upgrading potentially lead to robust
industrial welfare, benefits have not always evolved from upgrading, nor do work-
place benefits guarantee better industrial performance. The blurring of welfare
strands possibly lies in work’s essence: labor is not only different from other
commodities: “labor power has to go home every night” (Harvey 1989, p. 19).
Alternate social institutions share workers with industrial production in distinct
ways. A focus on work-place benefits therefore distorts or even overlooks
completely their evolutions, and the definition, physical location, separation (or
not) of home and work, and risks shared between both. For instance, in the United
States, Katznelson argues that workers “… act not on basis of the shared solidarities
of class at work, but on that of ethnic and territorial affinities in their residential
communities” (Katznelson 1981, p. 19).
3 Nations can be economically draining, even parasitic; an “economics of secession” might capture this.
4 Single measures are misleading. Countries with almost 100% healthcare coverage may still reimburse
hospital costs to only 50 percent (Beattie 2000).
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Yet, nation-states have been especially tempting analytical units, yielding over-
simplified aggregates of populations and industrial capabilities. Jamie Peck argues
that it is vital not to discard local labor market variations “ . . . as quirky deviations
from the universal competitive model by orthodox economists or as “noise” around
a prevailing national model by political economists” (Peck 1996, p. 12). Moreover,
nation-state versus market debates often gloss over land and housing, intriguing
omissions because, in the end, not nation-states, but city and regional states that
usually remain closest to action and political repercussions. It is not “national”
capital accumulation costs in assisting firms, designating and regulating workplaces,
linking work and home, and combining transactions of land, labor, and capital; city and
regional states control and collaborate with other institutions to mold migration,
housing, transport, and sanitation infrastructure for future industrial transformation.
Singapore and Hong Kong (and several Nordics) used housing as an essential
component of industrial welfare. China’s cities have contained and encouraged swells
of workers with combined regulation of migration, transportation, and factory housing.
However, in addition to the state, firms in these regions nevertheless bear work-
place costs in transitioning their workers from secondary to primary status
(Doeringer and Piore 1971). Yet, these costs are lowered when alternate risk-
mitigating or pooling institutions such as state, caste, family, or religion exist
(Srinivas 2009). As state regulation shifts, or given market volatility and uncertain
demand, firms find ever-evolving local optima to off-load risks to workers who then
turn repeatedly to existing ties outside their work-place. No general equilibrium can be
determined ex-ante; optima may unpredictably co-evolve from local iterations (Sabel
1994; Srinivas 2008b, 2009), or vertical risk-mitigation from patronage (e.g., Platteau
1995). These result in oscillating degrees, not absolutes, of proletarianization.
Therefore a distinction in terminology is worthwhile. Building on Table 1, a
taxonomy of risk coverage can institutionally demarcate (a) territory (place) (b) labor
status (work), (c) employer-dependent benefits (work-place). These describe the
state’s relationships to firms and their regional risk ecology (see Srinivas 2009). The
three categories therefore advance evolutionary and testable paths and timelines for
the emergence and change of institutions and can make more evident gender
disparities. They offer distinctive policy lenses for economic downturns when work-
place benefits decline or disappear. The terms can be mulled over: national insurance
based on residence or citizenship is place-based even if administered through work-
places. French nineteenth-century municipal welfare lends itself to place-based
analysis mingled with some employer-driven benefits (work-place); contemporary
U.S. challenges are to expand beyond work-places; India’s rural employment
guarantees are work entitlements, which may (or not) eventually combine
contributory benefits independent of places and work-places.
The evolution of early industrializers
Seventeenth-century English transformation of labor markets and trade was
fundamentally a town and city phenomenon where proletarians assembled in cities
of different sizes (Hohenberg and Lees 1984; Tilly 1984; Mikkelsen 2005). Other
parts of Europe witnessed more rural industrialization, thus physical location overall
was vital in determining the political pressures of urban-rural, religious, and ethnic
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divides (Mikkelsen 2005). Work-place benefits have variously depended on these
other institutions. Nordic “third sector” voluntarism grew out of state accommoda-
tion, subsidization, and often encouragement, of voluntary organizations as sites of
‘bridging social capital’ (Kangas and Palme 2005). These resulted in centralized
wage-bargaining but locally influenced by sector: lowered profits through relatively
high wages in declining productivity sectors and low wages in higher productivity,
fast paced sectors, and thus increased profits (Moene and Wallerstein 2006).
Moreover, increasing populations and urban re-structuring (slums, factories, town-
ships, universities, and hospitals) fueled the shifts among place-based, work-place
based, and more universal (and national) measures of work. Over a hundred-year
period, German social insurance developed from small voluntary insurance schemes
to state-supported and regulated compulsory insurance (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn
2002). Although U.S. welfare was anomalous in many respects, its cities too
provided density of insurance coverage and benefits. However, the instituting of the
Medicare Social Security Act made it more difficult to promote programs outside
work-places, resulting in distrust between unions and other organizations (Berkowitz
and McQuaid 1980; Rosner and Markowitz 2003). Place-based systems then ceded
to work-place systems but not to further universal coverage.
Three trends are visible over approximately 400 years: changes in place-based
systems of care, reduction in the gaps among three types of entitlements, and a
centralization of welfare administration. Yet, European rules of settlement and
registration continued to provide vital eligibility and mobility missing in LIs.
1. Place-based welfare.
European place-based care systems pre-date local government. Various aspects of
territorial community were more congruent with government before the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries (Wollmann 2006).5 Local self-governments in medieval
England and Sweden were closely aligned with rural communities where full-scale
feudalism was less common. Ecclesiastical parishes and “quasi-republic” towns in
England and Germany had free status within monarchic territories and retained the
freedom to define settlement and welfare (ibid.).
In medieval times, the institutional complex of family, church, and growing
emphasis on individualism, led to the rise of “corporations” (Greif 2005). These took
on diverse regionally-based solidarities and organizational forms such as fraternities,
mutual insurance guilds, universities, communes, military orders, and city-states
(Greif 2004, 2005). The shift to nuclear families alongside enabled the rise of self-
governance, individualism, and relatively arms-length relations among non-kinsmen.
Thus regional risk-pooling gradually tended towards non-kin risk-sharing. The
nuclear family’s dominance by the late medieval period and the fall of extended
families and tribes lent impetus to new economic transactions and social solidarity
5 As Wollmann (2006) emphasizes, English “government” alludes to parliamentary and policy-making
bodies and at the same time to executive and implementation. Since the nineteenth century, government
refers to central and local authority. However, German Regierung, and French gouvernement, refer to
central sovereign power, not local exercise of authority, and local government is primarily administrative,
not political.
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(Guichard and Cuvillier 1996; Razi 1993). In this process, many corporations
preceded European states. States, acting on shared interests with corporations,
established the basis for statutory provision.
2. Closing institutional and geographic gaps.
Medieval outcomes influenced later settlement rules and allegiances. English
fraternities, monasteries, mutual-insurance guilds, and customary poor laws provided
solidarity against sickness, disability, famine, and unemployment (Richardson 2005).
Buttressed by crop diversification and grain storage, they provided fairly continuous
coverage in the interstices among work, place, and work-places.
This was crucial because mobility of entitlements did not always accompany
labor mobility. A relatively seamless social security system was established by the
mid-seventeenth century in towns, regions, and parishes of England and Wales. By
contrast, even in progressive Holland, social security was patchy and largely
restricted to towns (Solar 1995; Szreter 2006). Old English Poor Law and settlement
rules sped up proletarianization, galvanized labor mobility, and reined in famine-
related mortality (Szreter 2006). English urbanization thus combined institutions of
settlement and registration (including thirteenth century English law of alienability
of land and identity registration) to provide unique risk-mitigation. Workers could
move, largely assured of some security (Solar 1995).
3. Centralization and nationalization rooted in settlement.
Industrialization and urbanization eventually forced local governments of Britain
and Germany into multifunctional forms, creating diverse “local welfare states”
before any centralization or nationalization project emerged (Wollmann 2006).
Legal traditions were partly responsible; British local councils contained no
community equivalent to the continental commune, kommune, or collectività (ibid.).
However, modern local government in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
diverged from local government embedded in local community; rather it emphasized
citizenship resting in property-dependent rights and residence. By the late nineteenth
century, Britain had entirely marginalized parishes, overhauled the scope of local
government, and “… had a long-term effect, in attenuating, if not extinguishing, the
emotional and cognitive ties between the local population and the newly established
local authorities in England” (Wollmann 2006, p. 1423). This heralded in both
England and the continent a disjuncture between territorial community and local
states. Thus, increasingly, risk-mitigation formerly undertaken by local governments
for local community became centralized and nationalized.
Yet, although the settlement and registration system came close to collapse from
immense migration and the rise of urban factories that challenged cottage
production, new actors initiated a return to local institutions. Independent chapels
separated themselves from existing church and registers, and new classes emerged:
“… growing commercial and property-owning classes in society were sufficiently
well aware that identity registration was of vital importance to their dynastic
economic interests…. they wanted a much improved, comprehensive, and accessible
national registration system established to serve their needs” (Szreter 2006, p. 77).
This state-supported national system built on these uniquely English local
institutions, provided a powerful boost to labor and capital markets and a distinct
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advantage for capitalism and knowledge transmission (North 1981; Szreter 2006).
Thus, locality proved essential.
Late industrializers
Effective demand-no rising tide
Although England’s industrial welfare evolved from strong place-based institutions
and the continent from more work-place orientation, both had far more in common
than with LIs in merging institutional variety. Late industrial institutional diversity
led to “thinness”; states constituted statutory programs but usually through anemic
entitlements, off-loading risks to families and women.
Keynes contended that laissez-faire economies generated insufficient demand.
Social insurance thus paved the European road to demand and higher consumption.
However, this proved more problematic in LIs. Technological prowess and the pace of
industrial transformation often raised risks, but preceded widespread systems of social
insurance, and provided little effective demand or consumption. Kaleckian insights
were more relevant to demand under state-targeted imperfect competition during
import-substituting industrialization. However, weakened by low risk-coverage, low
wage rates, fragmented power-sharing, and with no greater omniscience than private
actors in estimating demand, the LI state instituted or substituted for existing welfare to
a very limited degree. This piece-meal approach provided little of the effective demand
seen in Europe. Although early relative to their per capita income “stage,” LI welfare
was limited to public sector benefits and exclusionary industrial relations.
Variation—the thinning out of institutions
Late industrializers have followed various paths to social insurance. In Japan,
community health programs, Jyorei, were vital to risk-mitigation in the post-Meiji
period and to eventual national insurance. The early eighteenth and middle
nineteenth centuries marked the spread of these place-based voluntary programs,
high participation rates, and grain payment options (Inoue 1979; Ogawa et al. 2003).
Much later, the nation-state consolidated these century-old programs, and initiated a
national community health insurance in 1933 in specific regions, later opened to all
of Japan in 1935. Administration shifted to city associations and payments converted
to cash. In 1961, approximately 200 years after the first Jyorei began, insurance
became mandatory and universal coverage achieved. The family-corporatist hybrid
welfare state now uses national community health insurance for those outside
employer-driven health insurance, i.e., self-employed, farmers, shopkeepers, and the
unemployed (Ogawa et al. 2003; Campbell and Ikegami 1998).
The Korean state moved from productivist social policies to more universal and
redistributive goals after 1980 (Peng and Wong 2008). Decades of urbanization and
population growth spurred identification and registration (Carrin and James 2005).
Voluntary insurance commenced in 1966 (urban populations at 36.6% of total
population), grew by 1975 (48.4%) 2 years before the introduction of compulsory
social health insurance. The year 1977 marked the first social health insurance for
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corporate workers, and state supports for older and younger family members to pool
income and reduce risks; 3 years later (1980), urban populations were 57.3% of total
(Carrin and James 2005).
In both Korea and Taiwan, statutory policies offloaded risk to families and
women (see Kwon 1998). Taiwanese wage-employment provided occupational risk-
pooling but was far from seamless. Small urban states such as Singapore and Hong
Kong sourced foreign (and often illegal) labor and hence circumvented domestic
pressure for residence-based protections, resulting in productivist approaches
focused on work-places.
What did this set of historical transformations mean for LIs? Most, like Japan,
subordinated social policies to economic development and coerced other institutions
to bear development’s costs and risks. The state’s supports of labor segmentation and
control hierarchies allowed it to defray expenses through private markets resulting in
lower state-spending in social security, healthcare, and public education (Jacobs
2000; Pierson 2004). Where priorities dovetailed as in Taiwan or Korea, conflict was
relatively absent (Kwon 1998). In other instances, such as India (see below) of state
conflict and fragmentation between multiple developmental goals—economic,
security, and industrial welfare—the theoretical problematique of late industrial
development remains (Boyd and Ngo 2005; Srinivas 2008a).
It may be that states that retained informal social protections alongside rapid
industrial transformation built more robust statutory welfare (Japan), in contrast to
contexts where both states and informal programs were fragmented (India).
Culturally homogenous nations may therefore result in more rapid consolidation of
alternate institutions, although as Anderson points out, nationalism of the
homogenous form retains a certain philosophical poverty and incoherence (Anderson
1983). Still, even where statutory programs have emerged through consolidation of
“lesser” programs, rarely have they been instituted through constitutional fiat. Most
commonly, evolution remains stunted and local, not merging into any grand ocean of
national solidarity and industrial welfare.
Tilly echoes this: “Only rarely and (on the whole) recently have such arrange-
ments as social insurance and labor unions connected risky, valued, popular
collective enterprises directly with cities and states. Indeed, prudent members of
trust networks have generally tried to insulate them from predation or incorporation
by cities and states” (2010 in this issue). But late industrialization challenges and
extends his typology as a special form of evolution between cities, city-states, and
nation-states. The challenge arises from the unexpected combinative strands of
industrial welfare in LIs that had such systems well before the nation came into
being (Srinivas 2008a), and where, unlike in Europe, many colonial nations
preceded nation-states (Chatterjee 1986/1999).
Indian welfare
India’s 5-Year Plans (1951-present) presupposed long-term sectoral wage stabiliza-
tion, targeted social assistance, growing factory-labor with work-place benefits, and
an anti-urban bias for rural uplift. Yet today mandatory social insurance covers only
30 million (3% of the population) and is largely the domain of union (“organized”)
labor. Although India has recently instituted historic changes to industrial welfare (in
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2005 by extending rural employment guarantees and in 2008 by passing a Social
Security Bill covering 350 million “unorganized” workers), work-place expansion
have effectively stalled. In part, this is due to stunted manufacturing employment, an
explosion in low-entry urban services, growing self-employment and “informality.”
Place-based settlement security is absent, urban land prohibitively costly, and housing
and healthcare options highly constrained. It is unsurprising that various actors have
advocated universal entitlements based on work-status rather than place or work-place.
Institutionally and administratively however, this has proved problematic, explainging
the rapid, fragmented growth of for-profit insurance, community programs and “micro-
insurance” instead.
1. Liberalism and the Indian Republic.
In Gandhi’s remarkable interpretation of local autonomy and self-government that
so fired the imagination of Indian nationalism, risk mitigation occurred primarily
without the state. Although he rejected western institutions of European urbanization
and industrialization, Gandhi was no Luddite; his distrust of European history
stemmed from the belief that technological dynamism and social welfare were
closely woven. He saw Europe as attempting a false secular negotiation of
instruments of equality and justice derived from rationality and science with little
embedding in social realities (Nandy 1987).
In contrast, Gandhi’s republicanism was liberal and anti-state. “Self-rule,” Swaraj,
was existentially and pragmatically rule by the Self, freed from the state or large
collective institutions of regulation. Villages were to be governed by internal laws
and logics of truth or satya. These ideas derived in large measure from a unique
amalgam of Hindu philosophies of self and social organization, western enlighten-
ment, and pastoralism (Iyer 2000). Self-help was self-reliance, but risk was socially
embedded and morally shared. Gandhian republics would likely have warranted
industrial welfare in dense, localized areas rather than welfare capitalism driven by
nation-states. Yet modern rural Panchayati Raj based broadly on Gandhi’s ideas and
expanded by the 73rd Indian Constitutional Amendment, remained with strong state
and political party influence.
Neither Indian socialist rhetoric nor market capitalism was thus deeply embedded
and the extent of proletarianization was contentious. In Europe, population density
revealed links between large production units and urbanization (Mikkelsen 2005),
but this was less obvious in India. The Indian self-employment to wage labor transition
was also less critical than transitions between various forms of proletarianization with
distinctive regulations over settlement (Lucassen 2005; Krishnamurthy 1983; Kumar
1992). Factory work averaged less than 10% of the population and the working
majority was always rural where agricultural patronage politics often provided
“vertical” risk-mitigation against worker famine (Platteau 1995).
2. Secularization of non-secular risk mitigation.
While priests, pastors, and fraternities influenced Europe’s welfare alongside
state-instituted programs, the Indian constitution stepped worriedly away from
religious identities. Registered industrial firms provided the primary state-recognized
route to industrial welfare and the state continued to be a formidable employer. Yet,
ironically, affirmative action-type “reservation” policies based on caste and religious
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quotas formed the core of industrial welfare, resting in Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, and Other Backward Classes of Hindus (OBCs).
Despite the secular Constitution statutorily over-writing variation into a language
of solidarity and welfare for six post-independence decades, alternate institutions
persisted through caste, jati, religion, language, gender, and unions. Each had
important occupational and technological effects: concentration of caste by sector,
skills transmission through caste and family, and language hewed to geography.6
Group rights often subsumed individual labor rights, and caste created substantial
limits on mobility (Kumar 1992). Gender and religion curtailed access to statutory
programs and limited the spread and mobilization in home-based occupations and
piece-rate work such as in garments and agarbatti (incense).
A fully capitalized wage-based economy therefore poorly describes late nineteenth
and twentieth century Indian labor. Urban wage-dependence was bounded by ties to
neighborhoods, rural life, caste, jati, language, and religion. In the industrial
metropolises of Bombay and Madras, workers depended on pragmatic risk-sharing
and mitigation. From overlapping living spaces to healthcare, borrowed money, social
and moral supports, and the distribution of work, water, food, even building materials,
unregulated ties provided a modicum of security (Das Gupta 1994). The configuring
of an urban proletariat was thus partial, distinctive, and by no means inevitable.
Indeed, nation and class were not sole fulcrums of mobilization. Marxist work-
place and class discourse imperfectly corresponded to social hierarchies and
inevitably, new movements emerged, e.g., the Arya Samaj, the Brahmo Samaj,
Baden-Powell’s Scouts, and the more militant Rashtriya Seva Samiti (Watt 2005).7
Most situated “seva” (service) beyond the exclusive scope of work-places.
However, unlike European “corporations” from which firms, guilds, and eventually
class solidarities took root, and despite surmounting religious, occupational, and
physical segregation, neither they nor the nation-state offered a convincing
universalism.8 The Backward Classes Movement emerged by the time of the 1901
and 1911 censuses objecting to the state awarding superiority to groups through
caste structure counts (Srinivas 1967). Alongside, other caste associations formed
the charge against the state for “reservations,” affirmative-action quota privileges in
public employment. The nation-state thus rooted industrial welfare in public work-
place benefits, preferentially accessed through caste and religion.
3. Royal Mysore and Republican Karnataka: contestation and stagnation of work-
place entitlements.
Southern histories of the autonomous princely states demonstrate further variation in
place-based and work-place welfare. Kerala, for example, emphasizes path-dependency:
7 The earlier Bhakti-movement’s religious figures similarly urged against caste distinctions. Musicians and
saints preached love and devotion and dramatically different discourses of universalism and service.
8 Greif (2005) defines corporations as “intentionally created, voluntary, interest-based, and self-governed
permanent associations. Guilds, fraternities, universities, communes and city-states are some of the
corporations that dominated Europe. Businesses and professional associations, business corporations,
universities, consumer groups, republics and democracies are some of the corporations in modern
economies” (2005, p. 1).
6 E.g., the diamond sector with the Jains has extended family systems of welfare, skills transmission,
specialized global business practice, and gender roles.
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advances emerged not during democratic Communist rule but from nineteenth century
welfare expansion instituted byCochin and Travancore monarchs (Desai 2005). Keen to
ward off British annexation, unlike Malabar under direct British rule, they unwittingly
created new solidarities of radical caste and class movements that built momentum for
wider redistribution.
Mysore was seen as equally socially enlightened, but its welfare much less secure.
Industrial transformation followed Mysore (capital Mysore) under the Wodeyar
dynasty, the kingdom’s accession under Jayachamarajendra Wodeyar to India in
1950, linguistic and political re-consolidation under the States Reorganization Act
(as State of Mysore) in 1956, and further reconsolidation in 1973 (renamed
Karnataka, capital Bangalore, 2008 pop. 53 million). It distinctively sowed a middle
industrial path, emphasized public universities and research institutes, and generated
substantial technological advances. Unlike Kerala (social exemplar), its social
protection record was poor and industrial dynamism high; unlike Tamil Nadu its
anti-Brahmin movement was less violent and linguistic politics less jingoistic; unlike
Andhra Pradesh, it suffered less Maoist militancy and agrarian unrest.
The early Wodeyars observed a secularist rule. Yet, Mysore introduced caste-
based quotas in the nineteenth century, due in part to wider anti-Brahmin
mobilization, the aristocratic Arasu/Urs caste’s support for peasant politics, and its
unease with the Brahmin-dominated bureaucracy and Dewanship (Björn 1979;
Sugitha 1982).9Although inequality increased, Chamarajendra Wodeyar established
the Mysore Representative Assembly in 1881, providing a forum for Brahmins, and
“backward” but dominant Lingayats and Vokkaligas. In the absence of independent
middle peasantry and despite reigning landlords, the symbolic Dasara festival
Assembly also expanded, serving to air discussion and to limit agrarian unrest (Made
Gowda 1983; Sugitha 1982).
The late industrial surge instigated by Maharaja, chief advisory Dewan and
engineers, resulted in a series of modernization shifts and partial stabilization of
social relations. Significant capitalist transformations were underway by the early
1900s propelled by British commercialization of Mysore’s agriculture, resulting in
expanded domestic and export markets and increased risks to farmers (Made Gowda
1983). The Dewan and landlords instituted agribusinesses in sugar manufactories
and iron foundries (ibid., p. 197). Large agrarian populations arose in rural farm and
non-farm work, general labor, and earth and masonry work. These technological
changes did little, however, to dislodge the power of royals and landed gentry
toward landless labor; Holageris (farm workers) were pushed further to town
outskirts and coolies (head-loaders) although sometimes provided government
housing, were altogether outside towns such as Chikkamagalur (ibid.).
Meanwhile, non-Brahmin groups had mobilized and instituted alternate avenues
to public (especially civil-service) appointments, e.g., the Mysore Lingayat
Education Fund in 1905 and the Vokkaligara Sangha in 1906 (Manor 1977). By
1919, the British Miller Committee redefined public recruitment quotas and
designated as “backward” all but Brahmins, Europeans, and Anglo-Indians, a
characterization that continued until 1956 (Miller 1919; Sugitha 1982).
9 The southern anti-Brahmin movement was especially intense, aggravated by British divide-and-rule
strategies.
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Royal support for the Miller recommendations leeched momentum away from
mass-based industrial politics. First in mining and plantations, then textiles and steel,
proletarianization emerged by 1920 mainly through migrant Tamils and hill tribes in
Mysore and Bangalore districts (Sugitha 1982). Agitations for wider welfare
emerged much later from the involvement of the Indian National Congress party
with the Mysorean nationalist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, and their eventual
confluence with regional trade union movements.10 The Trade Union Act of British
India in 1926 had had limited impact and strikes continued through the 1930s and
1940s in mining and textiles. By the 1940s, World War II had boosted public industrial
production in textiles, gold, and heavy industry in Bangalore and Badhravathi, yet the
state (a dominant employer) determinedly ignored unions and welfare.
Mysore bequeathed technological and scientific infrastructure and organizations
to Karnataka and Bangalore, yet caste-based groupings remained solidly intact in the
new republic. Based on elite mobilization and quota policies of the prior period,
neither national nor regional states were able to re-consolidate power. Partial land
reform in the 1970s provided some new impetus to re-stratification, but class politics
and unionization were increasingly sidelined even after widespread public sector
strikes in the 1980s (Assadi 2006). Lingayats and Vokkaligas came to dominate
politics (the latter although dominant by numbers had ‘backward’ status and
benefits). Conservative, incremental changes, prevented dramatic social changes and
pitted several “disadvantaged” and OBC groups against each other (Manor 2007;
Assadi 2006). By the 1990s, 90% of Karnataka’s population was effectively slotted
into “reserved” and ‘backward’ classes (Assadi 2006). In factories, a class model of
antagonism or cooperation had broken down, and alternate urban organizing sites
emerged (Roy Chowdhury 2003). Sluggish unions allowed an uncontested stand-off
between two dominant political coalitions, the MOVD (Muslims, OBCs, Vokkaligas,
and Dalits) and the LIBRA (Lingayats and Brahmins) (Assadi 2006). Despite policy
continuity, this stand-off resulted in welfare stagnation and widespread corruption
(see also Kadekodi et al. 2007).
Overall then, between royal and republican state changes, a remarkable regional
industrial transition was underway. Yet, caste—and religion-based coalitions geared
to public employment access and benefits significantly slowed work-place or other
entitlements.
4. National rules to local discretion and quasi-rules.
Today, the new social security Bill has made local inspection and registration
rules for firms and workers vital to industrial gate-keeping (Srinivas 2008b, 2009).
Karnataka’s technological changes have fueled a services boom underscoring the
increasing limitations of the Factories and Boilers Act for work-place regulation. The
state’s bureaucracy seeks new legitimacy and partners outside a stagnating formal
economy. Although street-level bureaucrats operate amidst the contradictions of
successive regulations bequeathed from British, Mysorean, and the Indian state, the
ironic result of these contradictions is considerable autonomy and discretion in deciding
whether (and which) workers receive industrial welfare (ibid.). The quasi-rules they
10 Arguably, the Mysore national movement comprised three periods: 1885–1920 (mobilization without
organization), 1920–1937 (elite mobilization), and 1937–1947 (mass mobilization) (Björn 1979, p. 179).
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must construct for daily functioning make welfare expansion complex and uncertain. In
the absence of convincing and predictable statutory rules on the ground, there persists a
constant ebb and flow of workers to alternate risk-mitigating institutions such as family,
caste, religious group, even political parties. This regional ecology may be evolutionary
but not necessarily progressive.
Karnataka’s caste allegiances have crystallized the state’s strategy towards
fragmentation rather than domination over and consolidation of other institutions.
Industrial welfare has emerged in a messy overlay not of “traditional” princely
Mysore versus “modern” Karnataka, but rather of two versions of institutional
modernization for industrial development, first in royal, then republican periods.
India’s social insurance, unlike Europe’s, has therefore been strangely dislocated
from local institutions. The nation has been unable or unwilling to extend its
statutory umbrella and permeate webs of local risk-mitigation or pooling. Yet,
European models diffused by the ILO have further shaped Indian efforts at
Bismarck- and Beveridge-inspired factory-, military- and civil-services-welfare.
The remaining social assistance for the majority has little traditional risk-mitigation
or participatory and contributory benefits of social insurance.
Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered
Although the “abstract rules” of western societies tie in philosophically with the notion
of the invisible hand, arms length in market relations and arms length in industrial
welfare are very different. While national social insurance can impersonally pool
widely disparate groups and use market mechanisms, it has unevenly evolved from
more personalized rules of social grouping, monitoring, continuity, and sanction. Even
when states drive the process, deeply ingrained trust and welfare come neither cheaply
nor, always, democratically. After all, European fascism led to durable industrial
entitlements while democratic India continues without.
Nations therefore are not only imagined, they thrive on existing trust, cost- and risk-
sharing. Their territorial holds must be debated. Necessity and trust make workers
oscillate between allegiances to the state and other regional institutions, many older
than nation-states. These may undermine the state’s control, legitimacy, and efficiency.
Rapid late twentieth and early twenty-first century urbanization and industrialization
appear antithetical to the straightforward consolidation of these institutions.
Accounts of industrial history often seek convergence; the seductive draw of
nation-states is that they tell large, glorious stories of displacement and consolida-
tion. However, satisfying though national pension accounts and health spending may
be as measures, they provide no deeper analysis of institutional variety. As the state’s
delicate (and often failing) balancing act between production and redistribution,
industrial welfare can best be locally judged. The city or region can fade as a second-
order variable in some analyses, while remaining as first-order in others. Parts
woven into whole fabric are to be judged at the whole, but parts unwoven and
threads pulling apart have a different story to tell. The larger the whole, the bigger
the holes and the more contested the tensile strength of the composite. The dynamics
of industrial welfare must be judged ultimately through cities and regions, the weave
of nations. “Informal” risk-pooling institutions and organizations may have shielded
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themselves from states where necessary, but many threw in their lot with nation-
states. Understanding the weave of diverse skeins into the fabric of nationality and
citizenship will require new approaches to technological change and to the shifting
economics of risk-pooling.
Economic linearity will thus not take us far. Late industrialization has dwelt
theoretically in this tension, never fully acknowledging that the institutional diversity
of latecomers might be better represented by parts rather than whole nation-states;
how else to tell the uneven stories of late industrialization? No coincidence that the
emphasis of such theories has rested in small nations, homogenous nations, and city-
states. Ultimately however, these provide weak litmus tests for states, other
institutions, and the founding economics of industrial welfare.
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